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Abstract—The use of a laser to inject faults into SRAM
memory cells is well known. However, the corresponding fault
model is often unknown or misunderstood: the induced faults
may be described as bit-flip or bit-set/reset faults. We have
investigated in this paper whether the bit-set/reset fault model
or bit-flip fault model may be encountered in SRAMs. First, the
fault model of a standalone SRAM was considered. Experiments
revealed that the relevant fault model was the bit-set/reset. This
result was further investigated through electrical simulations
based on the use of an electrical model of MOS transistors under
laser illumination. Then, fault injections have been performed
on the RAM memory of a micro-controller to check the validity
of the previous results based on experiments and simulations.
Keywords-Laser Fault injection, SRAM, Fault model, SPICE
Simulation, Bit-flip, Bit-set, Bit-reset.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure circuits are prone to a wide range of physical
attacks. Among them, fault attacks (FA) are based on the
disturbance of the chip environmental conditions in order
to induce faults into its computations. Fault injection may
be achieved by using laser exposure [1], voltage [2] or
clock glitches [3], electromagnetic perturbation [4], etc. It
exists a very efficient method called Differential Fault Attack
(DFA) applied to encryption algorithms that takes advantage
of a comparison between correct and faulted ciphertexts to
retrieve the secret key used during the ciphering process
[5], [6], [7], [8]. In these attacks, the fault model [9] can be
very restrictive and is often the base of the attack efficiency.
Thus, it is important to know what fault model is relevant
or feasible with the targeted chip.
This work reports the study of the fault model of SRAM
memory cells when exposed to laser pulses. Transient fault
injection in memory elements is often modelled according
two fault models: (1) the bit-set/reset model and (2) the
bit-flip model. A data bit suffers from a bit-set (resp. a
bit-reset) fault, if it is changed from 0 to 1 (resp. from 1
to 0), thus creating a calculation error. On the contrary, it
remains unfaulted if its logical value was yet a 1 (resp. a
0). This data-dependent fault type is very worrying as it
makes it possible to mount safe error attacks against cryp-
tosystems [2], [10], [11]. A data bit suffers from a bit-flip
fault if it is inverted regardless of its value. This latter fault
model is data-independent. The injected faults in SRAMs are
often described in research papers according these two fault
models [12]. However, to the best of our knowledge, their
relevance has never been precisely investigated. Moreover,
the bit-flip fault model is questionable according a first order
analysis of the laser-sensitive zones of an SRAM cell.
Our main contributions to that research field are:
• the identification on experimental basis of the actual
fault model of laser-induced faults into SRAM cells,
• the use of electrical simulations that consider the in-
duced photo-currents and the topology of the targeted
SRAM cell to assess and further analyse the fault model.
This paper is organized as follows. The first part reminds
the effects of laser on silicon and emphasizes the notion
of laser-sensitive zones on CMOS circuits. Then, a set of
assumptions, derived from this notion, is made and its con-
sequences on the fault model of an SRAM cell are reviewed.
The second part reports the experiments we have carried out
to find out the right fault model. In the third part, simulations
results based on a proper model of laser-induced effects are
displayed and commented for deeper analysis purposes. The
forth part reports further experiments conducted on a micro-
controller’s RAM memory. Finally, a conclusion summarizes
the different results and some perspectives are given for
future works.
II. SEU ON SRAM CELL
A. From SEE to SEU
A photoelectric effect is generated by a laser beam passing
through silicon provided that its photons energy is greater
than the silicon bandgap [13]. This effect creates electron-
hole pairs along the laser path. Generally these pairs recom-
bine and there is no noticeable effect on the IC’s behaviour.
However, under specific conditions, some undesired effects
may appear: the so-called Single Event Effects (SEE). A
SEE happens when the charge carriers (i.e. electrons and
holes) created by the laser beam are drifted in opposite
directions by the electrical field found in the PN-junctions of
CMOS transistors instead of recombining. As a consequence
a transient current (i.e. moving charge carriers) is generated
through the struck junction. This phenomenon is depicted in
the left part of Figure 1, where the PN-junction of an NMOS
transistor in its turned "OFF" state is drawn.
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Figure 1. Photoelectric effect of a laser beam through a PN-junction (left)
- Transient current resulting from charge collection after a laser shot [14]
(right).
This phenomenon can be decomposed in two parts de-
scribed in [14]. In a first time, the depletion region (hence
the electric field) is stretched along the laser beam, the
charges nearby are collected in a few picoseconds and gives
a current peak, called funneling. In a second time, the
remaining charges are collected in a longer phenomenon,
called diffusion. The current decreases slowly until all
charges are collected. The outline of the corresponding
photo-current is displayed on the right part of Figure 1.
It exists a strong electric field, sufficient to create a
transient current as explained above, in any PN-junction of
the transistors used in CMOS logic regardless of their state
(i.e. turned "ON" or "OFF"). However, such a transient
current may, or may not, have an effect on the target’s logic
signals depending on both its location and the data handled
by the logic. These dependencies are usually explained by
considering the inverter case (see Figure 2).
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Figure 2. Inverter’s schematic with its data-dependent sensitive areas.
Consider the left part of Figure 2 where the inverter’s
input is at a low logical level: its PMOS transistor is turned
"ON" and its NMOS transistor is turned "OFF". Hence the
inverter’s output is at a high logical level and its output’s
capacitive load (dotted in Figure 2) is charged. The inverter
has four PN-junctions which are likely to give rise to a
transient current if struck by a laser: the drains and sources
of both PMOS and NMOS transistors. Nevertheless only a
transient current originated in the NMOS’ drain will result
in a disturbance of the inverter’s output (pointed out by
a filled grey ellipse). In that case, the transient current is
flowing from the drain to the substrate which is grounded
(as drawn in the left part of Figure 1). Hence the capacitive
load is discharged provided that the transient current is big
enough to overcome a charging current flowing through
the "ON" PMOS transistor. As a result the output of the
inverter passes temporarily to a low logical level. When
the transient current vanishes, the capacitive load is charged
again via the turned "ON" PMOS transistor. Thus, due to
the transient current generated in the NMOS’ drain, the
output voltage of the inverter undergoes a transient voltage
inversion. This transient voltage may then propagate through
the downstream logic: a so-called Single Event Transient
(SET). Any transient current created in the NMOS’ source has
no effect on the output since it is isolated from the output
by the turned "OFF" NMOS. Regarding the transient currents
created in the PMOS’ diffusions, they create a leakage path
to the N-well which is biased at the core supply voltage (i.e.
Vdd). Hence they have no discharging effect on the output’s
capacitive load. To sum up, the only laser-sensitive area of
an inverter, when its input is in a low logical state, is the
drain of the "OFF" NMOS transistor.
Likewise, when considering an inverter with its input at
high level (right part of Figure 2), a similar reasoning may
be conducted. It results that the only laser-sensitive area of
an inverter when its input is in a high logical state is the
drain of the "OFF" PMOS (underlined in grey).
As a conclusion, the laser-sensitive area of a CMOS
inverter is the drain of the "OFF" transistor, whose location
is changing with the logical level of the inverter’s input. In
a more general way the laser-sensitive areas of CMOS ICs
are data-dependent. The occurrence of a laser-induced fault
depends on the handled data.
B. The SRAM circuit
The SRAM cell used in this study is a configuration
SRAM (CSRAM), principally used to store the configuration
bitstream in configurable logic (FPGA). It is part of a
test chip designed in 0.25 µm CMOS technology with a
2.5 V power supply that embeds several patterns for laser
testing. This CSRAM is constituted by five transistors, more
precisely, two CMOS inverters and one access transistor. The
schematic of the CSRAM is depicted in Figure 3.
Figure 3. CSRAM’s schematic.
This CSRAM is used to store a configuration bit, which
is used through the output DATA_OUT. In the following
we will refer to the CSRAM’s state being state "1" as
node DATA_OUT has a high logical level (i.e. Q = 1);
respectively, we will refer to state "0" as DATA_OUT is
low (i.e. Q = 0). The configuration bit is stored by the
logical effect of the two cross-coupled inverters (built from
the NMOS and PMOS transistors MN1/MP1 and MN2/MP2
respectively). It may be updated (from the value of the
DATA_IN input) through the access NMOS transistor MN3,
as long as it is in "ON" state (for SEL = 1). As SEL = 0,
the access transistor is "OFF", thus the CSRAM is in its static
mode: it memorizes its configuration bit.
A picture of the whole test chip is given in Figure 4, a
zoom highlights the part where the CSRAM is located. The
size of the CSRAM memory cell is 9 µm by 4 µm.
Figure 4. Test chip view, and close-up to the CSRAM cell.
Hereafter, we will rather use the term SRAM as the
following results apply equally to standard six transistors
SRAM cells.
C. Theoretical analysis of the SRAM’s laser-sensitive zones
As presented in II-A, the laser-sensitive zones of a
CMOS circuit are data-dependent. The laser-sensitive zones
are highlighted on the SRAM’s layout in Figure 5. Two zones,
drawn in blue for laser-sensitivity in state "1", correspond
to the drains of MP2 and MN1 (these transistors are turned
"OFF" in state "1"). The laser-sensitive zones in state "0"
are drawn in red. They correspond to the drains of the
"OFF" transistors MP1 and MN2/MN3 (as seen on the
layout MN2 and MN3 share a common drain diffusion).
Thus, the analysis of the layout leads theoretically to the
existence of four data-dependent laser-sensitive zones: two
in state "1" and two in state "0".
Figure 5. CSRAM layout with theoretical laser-sensitivite zones: blue for
state "1", red for state "0".
Such a laser-sensitive zones cartography is consistent with
the bit-set/reset fault model. For a laser beam directed on
a blue zone, a fault may appear provided that the SRAM is
in state "1": this would be a bit-reset fault. Respectively,
for a laser beam directed on a red zone, a fault may appear
provided that the SRAM is in state "0": this would be a
bit-set fault. This cartography excludes the feasibility of
a bit-flip, for there is no location where a fault may be
induced irrespectively of the SRAM’s state (there is no
overlap between blue and red zones).
However, this behaviour is questionable. Indeed, the previ-
ous analysis was made under the assumption that one laser
shot will affect only one sensitive zone. Two parameters
put this assumption at stake: (1) the SRAM size, which is
4 µm ×9 µm; (2) the minimum feasible diameter of a laser
spot which is 1 µm given the laws of optic, moreover its
effect area may extend far beyond it (depending on the pulse
energy) [15]. Thus the laser-sensitive zones shall extend
beyond the drains: they may overlap as depicted in Figure 6.
The overlapping of laser-sensitive zones corresponding to
bit-set and bit-reset gives rise to the feasibility of a bit-flip:
if a laser shot arises on an overlapping area as depicted
in Figure 6, the SRAM’s configuration bit will be inverted
irrespectively of its state. This correspond to a bit-flip fault
model.
The next section presents the laser injection experiments
carried out on this SRAM cell for the purpose of identifying
the actual fault model.
-Figure 6. CSRAM layout with bit-flip zones.
III. EXPERIMENTS
A. Laser Set-up
The experiments reported in this section were performed
in front side with a laser source at 1064 nm wavelength.
The duration of the laser pulses was set to 50 ns. The laser
power range extends from 0 to 3 Watts. The size of the laser
spot could be chosen among three values, depending of the
optical lenses, let 1 µm, 5 µm and 20 µm. The test chip
was mounted on a motorized XYZ stage. It permitted us to
draw an experimental cartography of the laser-sensitivity of
the SRAM as reported in the following subsection.
B. Laser-sensitivity maps for small and large laser spots
An area of 10x10 µm2, around the SRAM, was scanned
with a resolution step of 0.2 µm. For each scanning point,
the SRAM was written either in state "1" or in state "0". Then,
the laser was fired. After a few µs the SRAM’s state was read
back and compared to the state value initially written. In case
of fault, the corresponding scanned point was added to the
laser-sensitivity cartography. We used the term bit-set fault
(resp. bit-reset fault) for a fault injected as the SRAM was
in state "0" (resp. in state "1"). Figure 7 depicts the laser-
sensitivity map of the SRAM at 1.6W and 1 µm laser spot
diameter. Coordinates corresponding to bit-set faults (resp.
bit-reset faults) are given in red (resp. blue).
In Figure 7, there are two zones corresponding to bit-
set faults (the drains of MP1 and MN2/MN3) and one zone
corresponding to bit-reset fault (MN1’s drain). The bit-reset
laser-sensitive zone corresponding to the drain of MP2 is
missing. The hypothesis that this missing sensitivity zones
is due to the metal coverage is not relevant here. As it can
be observed on the Figure 5, the drain of MP2 is not covered
by metal layer. A similar effect is also reported in section
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Figure 7. Experimental laser-sensitivity map of the SRAM at 1.6W
V. However, despite being promising, the analysis of this
phenomenon is out of the scope of this paper.
The main point with this cartography is that bit-set and
bit-reset sensitive zones do no overlap. Consequently, there
is no laser shot location where a fault may be induced
whatever is the SRAM’s state: the bit-flip fault model proved
irrelevant.
Identical results were obtained for other experiment series
conducted with laser spot diameters set to 1 µm, 5 µm and
20 µm, and laser power in the 1 W to 2 W range (the SRAM
cell is destroyed for a laser power above 2W , probably
because of a latchup and the SRAM’s value cannot be read or
write). As a conclusion, based on these experimental results
we concluded that the fault model of laser-induced faults on
this SRAM is the bit-set/reset model.
The obtained cartographies showed no overlap between
bit-set and bit-reset zones. However, these zones can almost
touch each others (see the bottom part of Figure 7) suggest-
ing that an overlap is not absolutely impossible. In order to
confirm the lack of bit-flip we have further investigated the
injection of faults in this location on a simulation basis as
reported in the next section. Moreover, additional tests were
carried out on the RAM memory of a micro-controller for
validation purposes (see section V).
IV. SPICE SIMULATION
A. Spice model
The simulations presented in this section were based on
the SPICE model of MOS transistors under laser illumination
introduced in [16]. According to this model, the photo-
current induced by the laser beam in any PN junction of the
SRAM was simulated by a voltage controlled current source
with a current amplitude expressed by:
Ilaser = (a ∗ V + b) ∗ Ωlaser ∗ S (1)
where S is the surface of the sensitive zone in µm2, a and
b fitting parameters depending on the laser power (Plaser
in Watts) and technology parameters, V is the reversed bias
voltage of the PN junction under the laser illumination. a and
b are expressed as follows (p, q, and s are fitting parameters
defined in [16]):
a = p ∗ P 2laser + q ∗ Plaser (2)
b = s ∗ Plaser (3)
Ωlaser is a parameter used to take into account the
distance between the PN junction of interest and the laser
spot (i.e. this model considers the topology of the target).
The equation of Ωlaser is :
Ωlaser = β ∗ exp(−
d2
c1
) + γ ∗ exp(−
d2
c2
) (4)
where d is the distance between the sensitive zone and the
center of the laser spot, c1 and c2 represents the influence
of the optical lens uses to focus the laser beam, β and γ are
fitting parameters.
To simulate a laser shoot on the SRAM circuit, each
PN junction of the SRAM cell was connected to a current
source modelling the laser-induced photo-current. Indeed, as
demonstrated in [16], even if the sources and the drains of
the "ON" transistors were not considered sensitive, a photo-
current could be injected by a laser shoot. To simulate this
effect, current sources had to be connected to all transistors
sources and drains, not only to sensitivity zones. Finally,
according to the layout of the memory cell presented in
Figure 5 and the different shared diffusions, seven current
sources were connected to the different drains and sources
of the SRAM cell. The schematic of the final circuit used for
simulation is depicted in Figure 8.
The surface of the SRAM was divided into squares of
0.5 µm ×0.5 µm. For each simulated point, the distance
between the laser beam and the different sensitive zones of
the memory cell were calculated and injected in the Ilaser
expressions of their corresponding current sources. The other
parameters have a fixed value.
B. Simulation of laser-sensitivity map
A first set of simulations was performed in order to
draw the laser-sensitivity map of the SRAM cell: Figure 9
also depicts the corresponding fault-models (on simulation
basis). This map was used for comparison purposes with
the experimental results of section III-B. It validates the
relevance of the model.
This simulated laser-sensitivity map is very similar to the
experimental laser-sensitivity cartography shown in Figure 7.
The sensitivity zone corresponding to the drain of MP2 is
well missing and at the bottom of the Figure, the bit-set
area and bit-reset area do not overlap. The model of laser-
induced effects has been developed for 90 nm technology,
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Figure 8. CSRAM schematic with current sources modelling laser-induced
photo-currents.
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Figure 9. Laser-sensitivity map of the SRAM cell obtained from simulation.
it can explain the slight differences of the sensitivity zones
between simulation and experiments performed with a test
chip in 0.25 µm. However, the behaviour of the test chip and
the simulation model were similar, that’s allowed us to use
this model to confirm the infeasibility of bit-flip fault (see
next section). The two possible initial states of the SRAM
("0" or "1") have been simulated.
C. Analysis of laser fault simulation results
In Figure 9, there is only one contact point (with no
overlap however) between bit-set and bit-reset zones: it is
highlighted by a rectangle. We report in this subsection
simulation results corresponding to laser injection in this
area in order to illustrate the lack of bit-flip faults.
The first simulation was run for a laser shooting at the
left inside part of this rectangle: a bit-reset sensitive zone.
The SRAM was initialized in state "1", the laser pulse (50 ns
duration) was simulated at 200 ns. As expected, a bit-reset
fault occurred as illustrated in Figure 10 where the voltages
at nodes Q and DATA_OUT are drawn.
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Figure 10. Bit-reset simulation: voltages at nodes Q and DATA_OUT.
The shooting zone is close to the drain of MN1 which
is laser-sensitive in state "1". As a result, a laser-induced
photo-current, Ilaser(MN1), flows from MN1’s drain to the
substrate which is grounded (see the corresponding current
source model in Figure 8). This current has a discharging
effect on node DATA_OUT. Note that a balancing current,
ISD(MP1), flows from Vdd to node DATA_OUT through
MP1 (which is in "ON" state): it has a charging effect on
node DATA_OUT. Both currents are depicted in Figure 11.
An SEU actually occurred because MN1’s photo-current
overcame MP1’s balancing current. It is more noticeable by
drawing the electrical charge injected by both currents on
node DATA_OUT as displayed in Figure 12 (its absolute
value is drawn).
From 200 ns to 220 ns, DATA_OUT’s charge decreases
slowly because Ilaser(MN1) prevails on ISD(MP1) by
only 10 µA. It drives progressively DATA_OUT’s voltage
from 2.5 V to the SRAM’s inversion threshold. Then, due
to the inversion of the SRAM’s state, this phenomenon
accelerates as shown by the charge waveform. Finally, the
SRAM stabilizes in state "0". A bit-reset fault injection has
been simulated. There is a second balancing effect which
comes from the photo-current induced in MN2’s drain:
Ilaser(MN2) displayed in Figure 13. It flows from node
Q (connected to MN2’s drain) to the ground.
Indeed, Ilaser(MN2) contributes to maintain node Q at a
low logical level. However, its strength is too weak to avoid
the bit-reset.
The second simulation was run with the same settings
but the SRAM initialized in state "0". As expected for
this location, no fault was injected. Figure 14 depicts the
simulated voltages of nodes Q and DATA_OUT.
The laser beam closest laser-sensitive zone likely to in-
duce a bit-set is the drain of MN2. Indeed the voltage of node
Q undergoes a transient decrease during the laser shoot (from
200 ns to 250 ns in Figure 14). However, it is insufficient to
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Figure 11. Bit-reset simulation: photo-current induced in MN1’s drain
(upper part) and current flowing through MP1 (bottom part).
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Figure 12. Simulation of the injected charge at node DATA_OUT.
change the SRAM’s state. The photo-current induced in MN2,
Ilaser(MN2), which has a discharging effect on node Q is
balanced by the current ISD(MP2), flowing through MP2
(in “ON” state). They are both depicted in Figure 15.
This balancing effect is clearly seen in Figure 16 where
the electrical charge injected at node Q is drawn.
Node Q undergoes a discharge of about 0.03 pC, far below
the 3.15 pC charge that was necessary to induce a bit-reset as
illustrated in Figure 12. Note that, Ilaser(MN2) only grew
to a maximum amplitude of 120 µA, whereas Ilaser(MN1)
reached a current amplitude of 400 µA when the SRAM was
in state "1" (see upper part of Figure 11). It explains why
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Figure 13. Simulation of the photo-current induced in the drain of MN2.
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Figure 14. Aborted bit-set simulation: voltages at nodes Q and
DATA_OUT.
no bit-set fault is induced at this laser location in state "0".
As the simulated laser beam is displaced to the right
inside part of the rectangle in Figure 9, it reaches a bit-set
sensitive zone. The third simulation we report was carried
out at this location with an SRAM in state "0". Figure 17
reports the voltage simulations of nodes Q and DATA_OUT
at this position. As expected, a bit-set fault occured. The
photo-current induced in MN2’s drain overcome the MP2’s
balancing current in the same way as with bit-reset fault
simulation.
The electrical charge injected by both currents, drawn in
Figure 18, has the same behaviour that one displayed in
Figure 12. MN2’s induced photo-current drives progressively
Q’s voltage from 2.5V to the SRAM’s inversion threshold,
then the electrical charge injected increases quickly until
the SRAM stabilizes in state "1". A bit-set fault injection has
been simulated. A photo-current is also injected on MN1’s
drain that contribute to maintain DATA_ OUT at a low
logical level but its maximum value is too low to avoid the
bit-set.
The last simulation was carried out at the bit-set laser-
sensitive zone with the SRAM in state "1". Figure 19 reports
the simulation of nodes Q and DATA_ OUT voltages during
laser exposure: no fault was injected.
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Figure 15. Simulation of MN2’s photo-current (upper part) and MP2’s
current (bottom part) in state "0".
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Figure 16. Simulation of the charge injected at node Q.
The electrical charge injected at DATA_ OUT’s node,
depicted in Figure 20, is 0.03 pC which is far below the
0.7 pC charge necessary to change the SRAM state. Thus, a
bit-reset fault is infeasible at this location.
Considering the two position highlighted on Figure 9 as
the most likely position to have bit-flip fault, this type of
fault is then infeasible on the memory cell.
To confirm the lack of bit-flip faults on SRAM cells, laser
fault injection experiments have also been made on a micro-
controller RAM memory as reported in the next section.
-0.5
 0
 0.5
 1
 1.5
 2
 2.5
 3
 0  50  100  150  200  250  300  350  400
Vo
lta
ge
 (V
)
Time (ns)
Q
DATA_OUT
Figure 17. Bit-set simulation: voltages at nodes Q and DATA_OUT.
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Figure 18. Simulation of the charge injected at node Q.
V. EXPERIMENTS ON MICRO-CONTROLLER RAM CELLS
A. Chip description
The test chip is an 8-bit micro-controller (0.35 µm CMOS
process). The RAM of the chip is depicted in Figure 21. Its
capacity is 4 kB divided in eight parts, each part contains
two blocks of 256 kB. It can be assumed that each SRAM
memory cell is constructed with six transistors (two cross
coupled inverters and two access transistors). According the
hypothesis made in part II-C, each cell should have four
data-dependent laser-sensitive zones (two in state "1", two
in state "0").
The fault injection experiments have been focused on few
bytes of the memory, i.e. a zone of 40 µm × 40 µm with
displacement steps of 0.5 µm. Laser injection was performed
through the backside of the chip, with spot sizes of 1 µm and
5 µm. For each fault injection, the protocol was the same
as described in section III-B. After the laser shoot, a block
size of 256 kB, containing the targeted bytes, was read back
and compared with the initially stored values.
B. Sensitivity of the RAM memory
Figure 22 shows the sensitivity map of the RAM memory
with a spot size of 1 µm and a power of 1.1 W.
Twelve SRAM cells are clearly distinguishable in this
Figure: for each of them a bit-set zone (in red) and a bit-
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Figure 19. Aborted bit-reset simulation: voltages at nodes Q and
DATA_OUT.
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Figure 20. Simulation of the charge injected at the node DATA_ OUT.
reset zone (in blue) were revealed. No bit-flip was obtained.
As with the experiments reported in part III-B, the bit-set
zone and bit-reset zone do not overlap. For each SRAM
cell, among the four theoretical sensitivity zones, two were
not sensitive (this result is consistent with the experimental
results of Figure 7, however, the analysis of this phenomenon
is out of scope of this work). We were able to conclude
on the absence of two laser-sensitive zones because we
knew what bit of what byte was faulted. In addition, this
methodology allowed us to draw a map of the memory (i.e.
the location of every bit). In Figure 22, the size of an SRAM
cell is highlighted by a square: it is about 5 µm × 5 µm.
Note that we have induced single-bit faults (i.e. faults
restricted to only one bit of the entire RAM memory) with
a success rate close to 99 % during these experiments.
Some additional experiments have been conducted on this
test chip at higher laser power and with a larger spot size.
Figure 23 displays the result of the experiment at 1.2 W.
More SRAM cells were sensitive but similarly to the previous
experiments, bit-set zones and bit-reset zones do not overlap.
Thus, increasing the power of laser has no effect on the
feasibility of bit-flip fault injection.
The last experiment has been done at 1.1 W with a spot
size of 5 µm. This time, the different memory cells were
Figure 21. View of the micro-controller with its RAM memory area
Figure 22. Laser-sensitivity map of the RAM memory at 1.1 W.
not distinguishable as depicted in Figure 23, yet the goal of
this experiment was to verify the lack of bit-flip fault. It is
clearly visible on Figure 24 that there is no overlapping of
the bit-set and bit-reset zones.
Despite the use of different spot size or power for the
laser, these fault injections on several SRAM cells confirm
the lack of bit-flip faults on SRAM cells.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have first reported laser fault injection
experiments on a configuration SRAM cell (CSRAM) similar
to those used to store the configuration bitstream of FPGAs.
Different laser powers and spot sizes were used in order
to investigate the corresponding fault model. The results of
the experiments showed that the bit-flip fault model is not
relevant for laser-induced fault in this memory cell. Only bit-
set (or bit-reset) faults are feasible, contrarily to assumptions
Figure 23. Laser-sensitivity map of the RAM memory at 1.2 W and with
a spot size of 1 µm.
Figure 24. Laser-sensitivity map of the RAM memory at 1.1 W and with
a spot size of 5 µm.
that may be drawn based on the fact that a laser spot may
cover several sensitive zones. Additional SPICE simulations
demonstrated and confirmed the infeasibility of bit-flip fault
on the memory cell under laser illumination. It also provides
a detailed understanding of the transition between bit-set and
bi-reset zones as the laser beam location is changed.
Because these results were obtained with a particular
SRAM, laser fault injection have been conducted on the RAM
memory of a micro-controller for validation purposes. The
results are in accordance with those obtained previously: no
bit-flip has been injected on an area of 40 × 40 µm2 gather-
ing several SRAMs cell. Moreover, during these experiment
series, almost all the injected faults were single-bit faults.
The bit-set/reset fault model related to laser-induced faults
in SRAMs is very worrying. It makes it possible to mount
relatively easily safe error attacks ([2], [10]) against cryp-
tosystems. Moreover, even if some bit-flips are obtained on
a given device, the occurrence rate of bit-set/reset faults will
be much higher than that of bit-flip. Such a bias in the fault
statistics will still permit to perform attacks like a differential
behavioural analysis [17].
Nevertheless, the analysis of the missing sensitivity zones
as reported in sections III and V could bring some interesting
elements to improve the security of SRAM memory elements
against laser fault injection.
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